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Abstract
In today's turbulent business environment innovation is the re-
sult of the interplay between two distinct but related factors:
endogenous R&D efforts and (quasi) external acquisition of
technology and know-how. Given the increasing importance of
innovation, it is vital to understand more about the altemative
mechanisms—such as alliances and acquisitions—that can be
used to enhance the innovative performance of companies.
Most of the literature has dealt with these altematives as isolated
issues. Companies, however, are constantly challenged to
choose between acquisitions and strategic alliances, given the
limited resources that can be spent on research and develop-
ment. This paper contributes to the literature because it focuses
on the choice between innovation-related alliances and acqui-
sitions. We focus on the question of how the trade-off between
strategic alliances and acquisitions is influenced by previous
direct and indirect ties between firms in an industry network of
interfirm alliances. We formulate hypotheses pertaining to the
number of direct ties between two companies, their proximity
in the overall alliance network, and their centrality in that net-
work. In so doing, we distinguish between ties that connect
firms from the same and from different industry segments, and
those that connect firms from the same or from different world
regions. These hypotheses are tested on a sample of strategic
alliances and acquisitions in the application-specific integrated
circuits (ASIC) industry. The findings show that a series of
strategic alliances between two partners increases the probabil-
ity that one will ultimately acquire the other. Whereas previous
direct contacts tend to lead to an acquisition, this is not true of
previous indirect contacts, which increase the probability that a
link between the companies, once it is forged, takes the form
of a strategic alliance. In the case of acquisitions, firms that are
more centrally located in the network of interfirm alliances tend
to be acquirers, and firms with a less central position tend to
become acquired. These findings underscore the importance of
taking previously formed interfirm linkages into account when
explaining the choice between strategic alliances and acquisi-
tions, as these existing links influence the transaction costs as-
sociated with both altematives.
{Strategic Alliances; Mergers and Acquisitions; Innovation Strategy; High-
tech Industries; Technology Sourcing; Capability Building; Transaction-
Cost Theory)
Introduction
Many high-tech industries are characterized by fierce
competition. To create sustainable performance differ-
entials with competitors, firms must constantly invest in
the creation of new technological capabilities (Leonard-
Barton 1994). Acceleration of R&D efforts and the de-
velopment of internal innovative capabilities are no
longer sufficient to cope with the increasing cost, speed,
and complexity of technological developments in high-
tech industries. Increasingly, even the largest companies
are obliged to use extemal sources of technology through
licensing, strategic technology agreements, or mergers
and acquisitions (Cohen and Levinthal 1989, 1990;
Gomes-Casseres 1996; Harrison et al. 2001; Lambe and
Spekman 1997; Mytelka 1991; Porter and Fuller 1986;
Teece 1992). In the remainder of this paper we will use
the term "acquisition" to refer to all interfirm linkages
that lead to integration of two entities. Such a combina-
tion can refer to the merging of two more-or-less equal
companies, as well as to acquisitions in which one
company obtains majority ownership over another
(Hagedoorn and Duysters 2002). We make such a dis-
tinction because it is often difficult to distinguish between
mergers and acquisitions. Acquisitions are often pre-
sented as mergers in the press in order to avoid negative
ORGANIZATION SCIENCE, © 2002 INFORMS
Vol. 13, No. 6, November-December 2002, pp. 714-733
1047-7039/02/1306/0714/$05.00
1526-5455 electronic ISSNWIM VANHAVERBEKE, GEERT DUYSTERS, AND NIELS NOORDERHAVEN External Technology Sourcing
publicity—particularly in an international setting
(Hagedoorn and Sadowski 1999). The crucial aspect of
both mergers and acquisitions for the purpose of our study
is that the firms involved cease to exist as independent
entities and are managed in an integrated manner.
This paper explores how innovative firms choose be-
tween two altemative organizational forms of extemal
sourcing of technology: cooperation by means of strategic
technology alliances and acquisition activities. Given the
increasing importance of innovation as a major compet-
itive weapon for many organizations (Porter 1990), and
the fact that innovation can be seen as one of the driving
forces of twentieth-century growth (Franko 1989,
Harberger 1984), it is important to study altemative
mechanisms that can be used to enhance the innovative
performance of firms.
Strategic technology alliances can be described as co-
operative efforts in which two or more separate organi-
zations, while maintaining their own corporate identities,
join forces to share reciprocal inputs. Acquisitions, on the
other hand, can be considered as cases of joint activities
in which two—once separate—companies are combined
into one company. Strategic technological alliances, as
well as acquisitions, are altematives to the sourcing of
technological capabilities over a market interface. In
older work on mergers and acquisitions, innovation was
hardly ever mentioned as an important motive. More re-
cent contributions to the innovation literature, however,
clearly stress the growing importance of acquisitions in
the knowledge acquisition process (Chakrabarti et al.
1994, Gerpott 1995, Grandstrand et al. 1992, Hitt et al.
1991, Link 1988). Acquisitions are increasingly impor-
tant organizational modes for the extemal acquisition of
technological know-how—especially in R&D-intensive
(high-tech) industries—because markets for information,
know-how, and technology are notoriously inefficient
(Hennart 1991). Generally speaking, technological know-
how cannot be bought "off the shelf," because it is dif-
ficult to evaluate and/or transmit. Evaluation is problem-
atic because know-how cannot be given for inspection to
a prospective buyer without the risk of attenuation of
property rights (Das et al. 1998). Moreover, technological
know-how cannot be transmitted easily from one firm to
another because it may be tacit or embedded in other
knowledge that is not part of the deal (Larsson et al.
1998). In a study of short-term contracts used in high-
technology sourcing, Nordberg et al. (1996) found that
these arrangements led to high transaction costs.
If markets fail, a firm may decide to gain access to
technological know-how through acquisition of another
firm in which the technology is embedded, or through a
strategic alliance in which the know-how and assets of
both firms are in some way combined (Doz 1996, Hamel
1991, Inkpen and Crossan 1996, Kogut 1988a, Lambe
and Spekman 1997, Mowery et al. 1996, Stuart 2000,
Young-Ybarra and Wiersema 1999). An acquisition
solves many of the problems of the transmittal of tech-
nological know-how, particularly as the relationship be-
tween the integrated entities evolves over time (Bresman
et al. 1999). However, when contemplating an acquisi-
tion, a firm often struggles with valuation and pricing of
the target assets (Balakrishnan and Koza 1993). If firms
enter into a strategic alliance, they avoid the terminal
transaction of transferring ownership rights, but still have
to take into account a market interface existing between
the two firms (or between the parent firm and its joint
venture). Thus, the problem of transmitting knowledge
may be mitigated but not altogether solved (Das et al.
1998, Larsson et al. 1998).
This paper explores the factors infiuencing the choice
between strategic alliances and acquisitions as altemative
means of extemal technology acquisition. Decisions con-
ceming extemal technology sourcing infiuence the com-
position of the technological resources owned by com-
panies, and thus ultimately the competitive advantage of
firms (Mowery 1988, Mytelka 1991, Poppo and Zenger
1998). The literature on strategic alliances and mergers
and acquisitions is vast and expanding, but very few stud-
ies have focused on the choice between these two modes.
Garette and Dussauge (2000) discuss the pros and cons
of alliances and acquisitions in the European context. Eo-
cusing on horizontal acquisitions and scale alliances,
these authors conclude that alliances are inherently less
efficient than acquisitions. They also note that alliances
can be pursued to tap the skills and resources of partners,
and that for this purpose alliances can be more effective
than acquisitions. However, they do not systematically
compare the pros and cons of alliances and acquisitions
in the context of technology sourcing. Hoffmann and
Schaper-Rinkel (2001) review the literature on alliances
and acquisitions, and distinguish between three categories
of factors infiuencing the choice between these altema-
tives: environmental characteristics, transactional char-
acteristics, and company characteristics. On the basis of
interviews and workshops with predominantly German
business managers, they conclude that alliances are more
favorable in high-uncertainty environments with dis-
persed knowledge. Acquisitions, however, seem to be
preferable in situations in which flexibility is less urgently
needed, and the utilization of economies of scale and
scope is more important.
These two papers provide a useful starting point for
further exploration of the choice between alliances and
acquisitions. Our paper contributes to the literature by
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analyzing the choice between strategic alliances and ac-
quisitions as altemative means of extemal technology ac-
quisition. The focus on technology acquisition as a mo-
tive, rather than on scale or scope (as in Garette and
Dussauge 2000), is based on the observation that this
is a predominant motive for strategic alliance activity
(Hagedoom and Sadowski 1999, Lambe and Spekman
1997). In contrast to both Garette and Dussauge (2000)
and Hoffmann and Schaper-Rinkel (2001), we empiri-
cally test our hypotheses using a dataset of strategic al-
liances and acquisitions.
In exploring the choice between alliances and acqui-
sitions, we base our reasoning on transaction-cost theory.
This approach has been used to explain many facets of
strategic alliances (Young-Ybarra and Wiersema 1999).
Transaction cost theory is particularly useful in explain-
ing the choice between discrete organizational altema-
tives (Williamson 1991), in our case alliances and acqui-
sitions. Employing the reasoning of transaction-cost
theory, we focus on characteristics of structural industry
conditions as factors that influence extemal technology
sourcing by firms. In particular, how do previous strategic
alliances influence subsequent acquisitions? The rationale
for this focus is that existing direct and indirect linkages
through strategic alliances are sources of information that
may crucially alter trade-offs in the choice between sub-
sequent alliances and acquisitions. Hence, the choice be-
tween these two altemative ways of extemal technology
sourcing is explained in a dynamic perspective, in which
the effect of earlier actions is taken into account.
For our empirical research we studied companies that
were active in the market for application-specific inte-
grated circuits (ASICs) in the period 1985-1994. Because
of the importance of technological innovation, the semi-
conductor industry is an appropriate context for studying
interfirm linkages as a means of access to technological
capabilities of partner firms (Stuart 2000). As described
in the data section, this is particularly tme of the ASIG
segment of the semiconductor industry (because of the
importance of keeping up with quickly changing tech-
nological developments and tumultuous alliance and
merger and acquisition activities). We study characteris-
tics of the network of firms active in the ASIC market.
How do these characteristics influence the choice be-
tween strategic alliances and acquisitions? We focus on
the following network characteristics: earlier strategic al-
liances between two focal firms, the proximity of these
firms in the network of relationships between all firms in
the study, differences between intraindustry and interin-
dustry and industry-segment ties, and differences be-
tween domestic and intemational ties.
The paper also explores an additional question: If the
link between the two firms takes the form of an acquisi-
tion, then who acquires whom? Here, too, we focus on
the position of the acquired and acquiring firms in the
prior overall network of interfinn relationships.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section
uses a transaction cost perspective to discuss the relative
advantages and disadvantages of strategic alliances and
acquisitions as altemative organizational forms of exter-
nal technology sourcing. We then focus on the question
of characteristics of the acquired and acquiring firms. Hy-
potheses pertaining to both sets of questions are formu-
lated. The third section describes the dataset, the opera-
tionalization of the variables, and the method of analysis.
In the fourth section we discuss the results of our analysis.
Finally, we draw conclusions and make suggestions for
future research.
Theory and Hypotheses
If a firm resolves to extemally source technological
know-how, and if it is able to identify another firm that
possesses the desired resources, then it still needs to
choose a mode for linking up with these resources. As-
sume that a pure market transaction is impossible for the
reasons discussed in the first section; the choice is then
between some kind of strategic alliance with, or acqui-
sition of (or merger with), the other firm. Below we will
first discuss strategic alliances and acquisitions as alter-
native organizational forms of extemal technology sourc-
ing. Subsequently, we focus on factors that may be as-
sumed to influence the choice between the two modes.
Finally, we address the question of who acquires whom
in the case of an acquisition.
Strategic Alliances and Acquisitions Defined
The label "strategic alliance" has been used for a wide
variety of interfirm linkages (Osbom and Hagedoom
1997). Nonequity linkages of a contractual nature are ex-
amples of strategic alliances, but equity-based linkages
(such as joint ventures) also may fall under this heading.
The crucial difference between strategic alliances and ac-
quisitions as defined in this paper is that the latter create
organizational hierarchies in the classical sense, and the
former do not (Hagedoom and Sadowski 1999). Thus, we
define strategic alliances as all those interfirm linkages
that do not result in one firm having majority ownership
of the other (or the creation of a new entity comprising
both firms, in the case of a merger). Strategic technology
alliances can take a variety of forms. Many different tax-
onomies of strategic technology alliances exist in the lit-
erature (see Auster 1987, Chesnais 1988, Contractor and
Lorange 1988, Duysters and Hagedoom 2000, Harrigan
1985).
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We focus on alliances that are characterized by a high
level of organizational interdependence and strategic mo-
tivation. Although there is no direct relationship between
organizational modes and strategic content, Hagedoom
and Schakenraad (1990) established that over 85% of ex-
isting R&D joint ventures and research corporations, joint
R&D agreements and research pacts, are strategically mo-
tivated. Other alliance modes were found to be less stra-
tegically motivated. This means that we focus exclusively
on strategically motivated modes (joint ventures and re-
search corporations, joint development agreements, and
research pacts). Given the amount of commonalities in
these alliances, it makes little sense to differentiate among
them. In studying interorganizational alliances between
semiconductor producers as a means of access to tech-
nology and know-how, Stuart (2000) found that an anal-
ysis including a wide variety of alliances led to similar
findings as an analysis concentrating only on certain types
of alliances. This suggests that as modes of extemal tech-
nology sourcing, different types of strategic alliances can
be lumped together in a comparison with the main alter-
native, acquisitions.
This paper will therefore focus on what we think con-
stitutes the major dividing line between altemative means
of external technology sourcing, viz., that between hier-
archical govemance under common ownership and all
setups in which hierarchical coordination is diluted and
mixed with other coordination mechanisms. Hence, we
argue for an analysis of two discrete altematives rather
than a continuum mnning from contractual agreement
through equity joint ventures to acquisition. The reason
is that strategic alliances and acquisitions, thus defined,
are modes of govemance that have their own inherent
logic and require different management styles and skills.
The logic underlying classical hierarchies (as formed
by acquisitions) is that of administration, with managerial
authority as the ultimate touchstone. According to Hennart
(1991), the fundamental decision of multinational firms
investing abroad is whether they want full control or
shared ownership. If that observation can be generalized
to decisions conceming external technology sourcing,
then the cmcial distinction is that between acquisitions
and all strategic alliances (equity-based as well as
nonequity-based) in which the partnering firms remain
distinct independent entities.
In strategic alliances, which cannot be governed by
managerial fiat like classical hierarchies, a contractual
logic or a logic of association prevails, depending on the
form of the alliance. Because govemance by managerial
fiat is impossible, coordination in strategic alliances must
be sustained by discrete negotiation over specific con-
tractual conditions, or by mutual expectations of reci-
procity (Osbom et al. 1998). Consequently, managing
strategic alliances calls for management skills that differ
from those in traditional hierarchical firms, e.g., lateral
communication, openness, and conflict resolution (Larsson
et al. 1998). Although we argue that the fundamental
choice for firms is between modes of extemal sourcing
that offer full ownership and control (i.e., acquisitions)
and all other forms (i.e., strategic alliances of all kinds),
we will test this categorization against an altemative to
ensure the robustness of our findings. A number of recent
contributions (Gulati 1995b, Hagedoom et al. 2000) have
argued that an important distinction can be made between
equity alliances and nonequity contractual agreements. If
ordered in terms of the strength of interorganizational
control they allow for, acquisitions can plausibly be as-
sumed to offer the strongest control, followed by equity
alliances and nonequity alliances (Hagedoom 1993,
James and Weidenbaum 1993). In our empirical analysis
we will check whether our findings remain unaltered
when we subdivide alliances into equity-nonequity
modes.
Choosing Between Strategic Alliances
and Acquisitions
As discussed above, both strategic alliances and acqui-
sitions can be interpreted as responses to failures in the
market for technological know-how. But what are the
relative advantages and disadvantages of both strategic
actions? Studies comparing acquisitions with altemative
strategies typically employ a transaction cost theory
framework—even if sometimes more like a guiding meta-
phor than as a very specific set of propositions (Koza and
Lewin 1998, Osbom and Hagedoom 1997). Recent stud-
ies of the choice between acquisitions and joint ventures,
for instance, emphasize various aspects of transaction-
cost theory. One approach focuses mainly on the problem
of evaluating a possible candidate for acquisition
(Balakrishnan and Koza 1993, Reuer and Koza 2000).
Typically, information about the quality and performance
characteristics of the relevant assets is not common
knowledge, and the information provided by the present
owners may be opportunistically biased, causing adverse
selection problems. Premerger inspections give limited
solace, as latent as well as apparent problems may still
crop up later (Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987). This line
of reasoning, rooted in the measurement branch of
transaction-cost economics (Williamson 1985), can be
called the information asymmetry argument.
Hennart and Reddy (1997, 2000) offer a different
transaction-cost-based explanation of the choice between
acquisitions and (in this case: Greenfield) joint ventures.
Acquisitions are less attractive if the desirable assets in
the takeover candidate are difficult to disentangle from
unwanted or undesirable ones. In that case, a strategic
alliance—for instance, in the form of a joint venture—
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becomes relatively more attractive. Hennart and Reddy
(1997) mention the example of a small biotechnology
firm that would like to buy (part of) the sales force of a
pharmaceutical firm, but might not be able to separate
this function from other, unwanted, functions and assets.
This argument, which can be dubbed the indigestibility
argument, is rooted in the asset-specificity branch of
transaction-cost theory (Williamson 1985). An acquisi-
tion including unwanted assets leads to higher manage-
ment costs, which are not offset by higher yields because
the unwanted assets are unrelated to the core business of
the acquiring firm. The problem may be aggravated by
differences in organizational or national culture between
the acquiring and the acquired firm. On top of that, ac-
quisition and intemalization may lead to a loss of high-
powered incentives. Balakrishnan and Koza (1993) also
acknowledge the problem of digestibility, as well as the
other issues mentioned by Hennart and Reddy (1997), but
they emphasize the ex ante market failure problems,
rather than the ex post organizational failure problems.
There is no a priori reason to assume that the infor-
mation asymmetry argument is more forceful than the
indigestibility argument, or vice versa. We suggest that
the relative importance of the ex ante and the (anticipated)
ex post problems emphasized by the two approaches de-
pends on the conditions under which the choice between
a strategic alliance and an acquisition is made. The in-
formation asymmetry argument is most forceful when the
(prospective) partner firms have little firsthand or second-
hand information about each other. From this point of
view, we should look at existing direct and indirect ties
as information channels between the firms in explaining
the choice between alliance and acquisition. The indi-
gestibility argument focuses on how different the two
firms are in terms of assets. Firms operating in the same
market or market segment may be assumed to be more
alike in terms of asset composition than firms operating
in different industries. However, the indigestibility ar-
gument may also be applied to difficulties (unrelated to
asset characteristics) in integrating an acquired firm.
Every firm has its own idiosyncratic culture, and differ-
ences in corporate culture may pose an impediment to a
successful merger or takeover. If the firms are from dif-
ferent countries, then national cultural differences be-
tween the acquiring and acquired firms may aggravate
integration problems (Hennart and Reddy 1997, Kogut
and Singh 1988). Various factors infiuencing the trade-
off between strategic alliances and acquisitions are dis-
cussed below.
Prior Direct Ties Between Partner Firms
Firms contemplating the establishment of a strategic al-
liance or an acquisition can use various sources of infor-
mation. Certainly, observations made by managers of the
company in direct transactions or in other interactions
with the other firm will be highly valued. This suggests
that the existence of previous ties between companies
may infiuence the choice of mode of govemance in a
subsequent link. A strategic alliance—in the form of a
joint venture, for instance—makes it possible for a firm
to gather valuable information about its partner's re-
sources, capabilities, and reliability (Balakrishnan and
Koza 1993; Gulati 1995a, 1998). Thus, the number of
prior ties provides an indication of the amount of infor-
mation partners have about each other. The more infor-
mation they have, the less serious will be information
asymmetry problems in partner valuation. Consequently,
this removes a major impediment to realizing an acqui-
sition.
Strategic alliances offer partners the opportunity to
leam from and about each other (Inkpen 1998). Over
time, firms develop capabilities or routines for their mu-
tual interaction. Partners become acquainted with each
other's idiosyncrasies, thereby deepening their mutual
understanding, which in tum improves the quality of the
relationship. Both the absorptive and communicative ca-
pabilities of firms are enhanced by interaction in prior ties
(Larsson et al. 1998). This suggests that such collabora-
tion can help to alleviate managerial indigestibility prob-
lems caused by differences in corporate cultures, thereby
facilitating integration in case of an eventual acquisition.
The decision to shift to an acquisition after a number
of previous alliances should be seen in a longitudinal per-
spective (Gulati 1998). Firms can use incremental strat-
egies in exploring and gaining control over extemal tech-
nological know-how. Investment in a strategic alliance is
like taking an option on technological know-how of yet
uncertain value, and shifting from a strategic alliance to
an acquisition is like the striking of that option (Bowman
and Hurry 1993, Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). If this
"encroachment strategy" (Hagedoom and Sadowski
1999) is used, a firm will move from a strategic alliance
to an acquisition as soon as the interaction within the
alliance has sufficiently dissolved the information asym-
metiy and mitigated the managerial indigestibility prob-
lem. An additional motive for an acquisition exists when
there is a technological alliance between a large firm and
a smaller firm that provides new technology. Das et al.
(1998) suggest that the larger firms tend to become crit-
ically dependent on their smaller partners, which may be
a reason for the larger firm to circumvent hold-up prob-
lems by eventually acquiring the smaller partner. How-
ever, our transaction-cost-based reasoning also applies in
these cases. Thus, controlling for size, we hypothesize:
HypOTHESts 1. The greater the number of prior stra-
tegic alliances between two firms, the smaller the prob-
ability that a subsequent link between them will again be
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a strategic alliance, and the greater the probability that
a subsequent link will take the form of an acquisition.
Although there has been some previous research related
to this issue, none of it directly addresses our hypothesis.
Hennart (1991), and Hennart and Reddy (1997), study the
mode of entry of Japanese firms into the United States,
focusing on the choice between wholly owned subsidi-
aries and greenfield joint ventures. They conclude that
indigestibility provides the best explanation for the ob-
served behavior. Balakrishnan and Koza (1993) compare
stock market reactions to joint-venture and merger an-
nouncements, and conclude that acquisitions obtained
more favorable responses when acquirers and targets
were more similar, a finding which they explain on the
basis of the expected smaller information asymmetry in
these cases.
While these three studies have no longitudinal per-
spective, three other studies do. Vermeulen and Barkema
(2001), approaching the subject from a leaming perspec-
tive, look at the propensity of a firm to use either start-
ups or acquisitions for corporate expansions. Start-ups
add no new knowledge to the parent firm, with the result
that the firm's knowledge base eventually becomes anti-
quated. After a series of start-ups, revitalization through
acquisition becomes increasingly necessary, and, as dem-
onstrated by the authors, more likely. However, Vermeulen
and Barkema do not examine previous ties between two
identified firms. Gulati (1999) studies the effect of pre-
vious alliance activities on a firm's decision to form a
new alliance, and finds a positive effect of having a cen-
tral position in the existing network. However, Gulati
looks only at alliances, not at acquisitions. Hagedoom
and Sadowski (1999) study the transformation of strategic
alliances into mergers and acquisitions. Their most rele-
vant conclusion in the context of this paper is that stra-
tegic technology partnering plays hardly any direct role
in acquisition behavior (based on the observation that
only 2.6% of the strategic alliances led to a subsequent
acquisition). This finding contrasts with Kogut's (1988a)
data, in which 25% of the joint ventures were acquired
by either partner during the following years. Also, Bleeke
and Emst (1993) found that 75% of alliances end with
one of the partners acquiring the cooperation unit, and
Garette and Dussauge (2000) found that 28% of "com-
plementary alliances" in Europe end with acquisition by
one of the partners.
An important difference between Hagedoom and
Sadowski (1999) and our study is that these authors only
look at the first strategic alliance between two firms and
subsequent acquisitions. Possible later strategic alliances
between the same partners, paving the way for an even-
tual acquisition, are not taken into consideration. Argu-
ably, it is better to look at the cumulative effect of prior
ties on subsequent external actions of firms—all the more
so because repeated prior alliances may indicate impor-
tant synergies. Thus, testing our Hypothesis 1 may lead
to different findings than those found by Hagedoorn and
Sadowski (1999).
Network Distance Between ttie Partner Firms
Two firms with no direct connection can be linked indi-
rectly by a common partner or by a set of common part-
ners interconnected by a chain of alliances. Even in the
absence of direct ties, proximity in the alliance network
provides firms with information about each other through
indirect experiences (Gulati 1998). Network distance re-
fers to the shortest geodesic path between two actors. The
expression geodesic path is used to denote the shortest
path between two points in the network. The shorter the
geodesic path, the closer two firms are in the alliance
network.
Expectedly, information exchanged through indirect
ties will be qualitatively different from firsthand infor-
mation obtained within a strategic alliance. Strong ties
offer three kinds of informational advantages: access to
information about current or potential partners as to their
capabilities and trustworthiness, timely information about
threats and opportunities—including alliance opportuni-
ties—and referral to and from potential partners (Gulati
1999). Of these three kinds of informational advantage,
referral is clearly a benefit associated with indirect ties.
However, it is plausible that timely access to information
regarding the capabilities and trustworthiness of a firm is
promoted more by direct than by indirect ties. In the in-
teraction within a strategic alliance, a firm leams both
about the other's management processes and about his
know-how and technological capabilities (Tsang 1999).
Firm-specific management processes and know-how are
characterized by tacitness, and leaming about these may
be possible only through close observation of and inter-
action with the partner's staff (Tsang 1999).
From this perspective, existing indirect ties are unlikely
to mitigate information asymmetry problems to the extent
that an acquisition becomes more likely when a direct link
is considered. Indirect ties may help a firm to form a
rough idea about the capabilities and trustworthiness of a
potential partner, but a steady exchange of fine-grained
information in direct interactions is necessary for a firm
to be able to evaluate more effectively the value of the
technological know-how of the other firm, as well as the
compatibility of management styles, in case of an acqui-
sition. On the other hand, the information exchanged
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through indirect network connections makes it more
likely that two unconnected companies become aware of
mutual alliance opportunities, and hence increases the
probability of such an alliance taking place. Embedded-
ness of interfirm relations in a dense network of common
ties in an industry may, moreover, encourage certain trust
and reputation effects. These, in tum, help firms gain a
higher level of control over their alliance partners than
would otherwise be possible (Raub and Weesie 1990,
Uzzi 1996), making ownership less necessary for control
reasons.
In terms of the arguments based on transaction-cost
theory, we propose that unlike direct ties, indirect ties do
not significantly mitigate information asymmetry and in-
digestibility problems. However, to the extent that em-
beddedness in a network strengthens reliance on tmst and
reputation effects, the formation and maintenance of stra-
tegic alliances is facilitated. Assuming constant indigest-
ibility and information asymmetry problems, the use of
this form of extemal technology sourcing is made rela-
tively more attractive than acquisitions. Hence:
HYPOTHESIS 2. A smaller network distance between
firms in the network of existing strategic alliances in-
creases the probability that a direct link, when formed,
will take the form of a strategic alliance, and decreases
the probability that a direct link, when formed, takes the
form of an acquisition.
Intraindustry and Interindustry Ties
The similarity or complementarity of products or tech-
nologies may influence the firm's decision as to whether
external sourcing of technology takes the form of a stra-
tegic alliance or an acquisition. Some authors (Gomes-
Casseres 1996, Roberts and Berry 1985) argue that a firm
has the propensity to acquire the other company if it has
similar technological competencies, i.e., when it is a
member of the same industry or industry segment (see
also Chi 1994, Teece 1986). When the partner has com-
plementary or completely new technologies to offer, stra-
tegic alliances are considered to be the best way to co-
operate (Hagedoom and Sadowski 1999). This coincides
with the information asymmetry argument: It is more dif-
ficult to assess the value of assets of firms in other in-
dustries or industry segments than in one's own industry
or segment (Balakrishnan and Koza 1993). It is also con-
sistent with the indigestibility argument, as firms oper-
ating within the same industry or industry segment are
less likely to hold substandal "indigestible" assets (Hennart
and Reddy 1997).
HYPOTHESIS 3. The probability that ties between firms
operating within the same industry or industry segment
take the form of a strategic alliance is smaller, and the
probability that these intraindustry/segment ties take the
form of an acquisition is greater than in the case of inter-
industry ties.
Domestic and International Ties
Strategic alliances and acquisitions can take place within
a particular country or across national borders. From a
transaction-cost theory perspective, it could be reasoned
that the higher level of uncertainty associated with inter-
national contacts is expected to lead to an increased need
for control. Because the costs of monitoring and main-
taining control over a long-distance strategic alliance are
high, there is greater probability of a link taking the form
of an acquisition rather than a strategic alliance
(Hagedoom and Sadowski 1999). However, we believe
that there are countervailing arguments that carry more
weight. On the basis of the information asymmetry ar-
gument, acquisitions would be expected to be more dif-
ficult between partners located in different countries, as
international premerger inspections are even more prob-
lematic than domestic ones due to geographic and lan-
guage barriers.
Cultural differences may also be expected to play a
role. The transparency of the other firm may be more
restricted when that firm is from another culture (Larsson
et al. 1998). Cultural differences also make the manage-
rial indigestibility problem more serious in intemational
linkages. Kogut and Singh (1988), studying the choice
between joint ventures and acquisitions of firms entering
the United States, found that joint ventures (in our ter-
minology a specific type of strategic alliance) were pre-
ferred to acquisitions when the entrant's home country
was culturally distant from the United States. The reason
for reticence with regard to intemational acquisitions is
that cultural differences hamper integration and com-
pound the management problem even after integration
(Hennart 1991). In line with this reasoning, the results of
Hagedoom and Sadowski (1999) did not support their
hypothesis that intemational strategic alliances would
tend strongly to transform into acquisitions, based on the
firm's assumed greater need for control in cross-border
ties.
Another argument, which leads to the same prediction
as the information asymmetry and indigestibility argu-
ments, is that in case of domestic ties acquisitions are
more likely because potential collaborators are also po-
tential competitors (Kay 1991). This argument is of par-
ticular importance in the context of high-tech industries.
An innovating firm risks leakage of valuable technolog-
ical know-how through the leaming processes of the ally
within the strategic alliance, possibly leading to erosion
of home-market share.
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In sum, most of the arguments point in the same direc-
tion. A firm needing more control, due to stronger uncer-
tainties in cross-border ties, may choose a type of stra-
tegic alliance that allows a reasonable degree of control.
Research by Gulati (1995b) and Hagedoom and Narula
(1996) shows that intemational strategic alliances are
more equity oriented, and that domestic strategic alliances
are more often of a contractual nature. Since this study
lumps together all these different kinds of alliances, we
cannot make these distinctions.
HYPOTHESIS 4. The probability that international ties
between firms take the form of a strategic alliance is
greater, and the probability that these international ties
take the form of an acquisition is smaller than in the case
of ties within national borders.
Who Acquires Whom?
The hypotheses developed above all focus on the question
of which form of external link between firms is more
likely: a strategic alliance or an acquisition. This section
focuses on a different question: Given that the form of
the external link is that of an acquisition, can we predict
who acquires whom? In common with the previous dis-
cussion (of the infiuence of prior ties on the probability
of a new link taking the form of an acquisition), this dis-
cussion will also concentrate on the effect of the existing
network of interfirm ties. Whereas we have thus far as-
sessed the impact of dyad characteristics, we will now
concentrate on the level of the individual firm.
Firms that entered into numerous strategic alliances in
the past were probably also the ones that were more vig-
orously seeking access to new technology. Experience in
collaboration allows a firm to establish itself in
information-rich positions (Powell et al. 1996); a firm
with this essential ability will be able to obtain access to
and exploit leading-edge technology. More experienced
firms—i.e., those that entered into a large number of stra-
tegic alliances—are therefore likely to be more centrally
located in the network of strategic alliances, and conse-
quently are more Hkely to get timely access to new tech-
nologies that are necessary to create a competitive ad-
vantage (Gulati 1998). As a consequence, a firm that has
moved into a central position within the network of alli-
ances has built a strong technological position, presum-
ably leading to increased growth potential, and enhancing
that firm's chance of becoming an acquirer rather than
being acquired. In the terminology of Ronald Burt, these
firms are more likely to have built a network of relation-
ships containing many "structural holes," giving them
more entrepreneurial opportunities and making them
more likely to play an active rather than a passive role in
acquisitions (Burt 1992).
The firm characteristic we are interested in here—the
capacity to gain access to new technological know-how
in a timely way and to take the initiative in acquisitions—
can be expressed in the number of alliances a firm has
entered into previously (alliance history), or in terms of
ties with other firms that are, in tum, only indirectly
linked to each other (network centrality). Network cen-
trality refers to the importance of a specific organization
for the overall structure of a network. In an information
network, a company that has a high degree of centrality
has the potential to control the fiows of information be-
tween those other companies (Freeman 1979). Firms that
are more centrally positioned in the network of interfirm
alliances have better access to and control over infor-
mation, and are therefore more likely to play a proactive
strategic role (Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven 2001).
HYPOTHESIS 5. Eirms that are more centrally posi-
tioned in the network of strategic alliances within an in-
dustry are, in case of an acquisition, more likely to be the
acquirer and less likely to be acquired.
HYPOTHESIS 6. Eirms that have formed more alliances
in the past and as a consequence have many network ties
are, in case of an acquisition, more likely to be the ac-
quirer and less likely to be acquired.
Other Factors Influencing the Choice Between
Strategic Atliances and Acquisitions
This paper focuses on the infiuence of previous strategic
alliances on a firm's choice between a strategic alliance
and an acquisition in case a new interfirm linkage is
formed. However, this decision is also infiuenced by other
factors that are not of primary interest here, but for which
we will have to control in our empirical analysis.
A first obvious factor that may infiuence the choice be-
tween strategic alliances and acquisition is the size of the
firms involved. Controlling for size is necessary because
of the particular role that large firms play in forming stra-
tegic alliances and in acquisition activities (Ghemawhat et
al. 1986). Foray (199t) and Duysters and Hagedoom
(2002) argue that large firms possess a high degree of stra-
tegic freedom to pursue strategies that lead to a mix of
integration and cooperation. As smaller firms do not have
this freedom to choose their strategies, the way in which
small and large firms acquire new technological capabili-
ties may differ significantly. Obviously, the relative size of
firms may also be expected to infiuence the question of
who acquires whom. Therefore, we will control for firm
size in our empirical study.
Secondly, particular forms of interfirm ties may occur
in waves. This may apply to strategic alliances as well as
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to acquisitions. One possible explanation for this phe-
nomenon is that strategic alliances may become fashion-
able, and that an initial series of strategic alliances creates
a bandwagon effect. The same reasoning applies to ac-
quisitions (Hay and Morris 199t, Van Wegberg 1994a).
Aitematively, the occurrence of waves can be caused by
changes in the environment (technological break-
throughs, for example) that impact all firms within an
industry (Amburgey and Miner 1992, Stigler 1950). In
order to control for these effects—which may mask the
trade-offs based on transaction costs that we are interested
in—we will include in our analysis a measure of the share
of strategic alliances in all interfirm ties that are formed
in the previous year.
Finally, the role and incidence of strategic alliances and
acquisitions may change over the life cycle of an industry.
Harrigan (1985, 1986, t988) argues that cooperative
agreements are transitional strategies, and that the period
in which they are most appropriate is short. In young
industries, technology is still in a fiuid state, entailing a
lot of uncertainty. Firms then often engage in short-lived
technology-based cooperative agreements to keep up
with the quickly changing environment by means of rela-
tively small investments. As an industry matures, the rate
of technological change slows down, and technological
uncertainty diminishes, leading to a decline in the relative
importance of technology-based strategic alliances. At
the same time, opportunities for intemal growth shrink as
the industry growth rate slows down. To consolidate their
sales, firms may opt for expansion strategies through ac-
quisitions (Hagedoom and Sadowski 1999). As we test
our hypotheses on data from a relatively young industry
(the ASIC industry) over a 10-year period, we must con-
trol for industry life-cycle effects. Therefore, we include
a variable measuring the annual growth rate of the ASIC
market, which is expected to capture the maturation of
the industry.
Methodology
In our empirical study we examined how companies
choose between strategic technology alliances and acqui-
sitions, using the dyad-year as the unit of analysis. We
focused our research on the Application Specific Inte-
grated Circuits industry (or ASIC industry). As in other
branches of the IC industry, technology acquisition is by
far the most important reason why firms team up with
each other or why companies with interesting technical
knowledge are acquired. The ASIC industry can also be
divided into three segments—gate and linear arrays, stan-
dard cells and full custom ICs, and programmable logic
devices (PLDs)—offering competing technologies for
different niche-applications: The ongoing technological
changes in these segments lead to intersegment compe-
tition which in tum is the basis for the establishment of
numerous alliances and acquisitions.
Data on strategic alliances and mergers and acquisi-
tions were collected in which at least one ASIC producer
was involved during the period 1985-1994, a period that
was characterized by strong industry turbulence due to
the establishment of numerous strategic alliances and ac-
quisitions. This cross-sectional time-series panel enabled
us to assess the infiuence of several factors on the choice
between strategic alliances and acquisitions.
Following the research method of Gulati (1995b), we
constructed adjacency matrices representing the relation-
ships between the firms in the strategic alliance network.
We computed matrices including all alliance activity
among the panel members prior to each year. Various net-
work measures were calculated using UCINET (Borgatti
et al. 1999). In constructing network measures of past al-
liances, a number of choices have been made conceming
the treatment of alliances. Alliances vary from equity joint
ventures and minority holdings with a strong organiza-
tional commitment and interdependence between allies to
nonequity joint ventures which imply only moderate levels
of organizational commitment (although stronger than
arm's length licensing agreements). Some authors weigh
each type of strategic alliance according to the strength of
their relationship (see Contractor and Lorange 1988, Gulati
1995b, Nohria and Garcia-Pont 1991). Because we are in-
terested in the choice between strategic alliances and ac-
quisitions, we have in our analysis compared acquisitions
with all types of alliances taken together. However, to test
for robustness, we have also performed an analysis in
which acquisitions are compared with equity and none-
quity alliances, as these three forms can be assumed to lie
on a continuum of decreasing levels of organizational con-
trol. Furthermore, we simply added the number of ties be-
tween two firms over the observed time period. Gulati
(1995b) mentions two altematives—adding the number of
ties and normalizing them by the maximum score possible
in that year on the one hand and the use of a Gutman scale
on the other hand—but we are not making use of them for
this study. The third choice relates to the length of the
period during which prior strategic alliances are likely to
have an infiuence on the current choice between strategic
alliances and acquisitions. One can include all past alli-
ances into the calculation of the social network variables,
assuming that all prior ties, no matter how long ago they
were established, have an impact on current firm behavior.
However, we chose a moving window approach, assuming
that only ongoing alliances have an impact on the choice
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between strategic alliances and acquisitions. We have an
indication about the termination of the alliance for 62
(29.0%) strategic alliances in the sample. For these stra-
tegic alliances we assumed that they have an impact on
the current choice between strategic alliances and acqui-
sitions as long as they were not terminated. For the other
strategic alliances we assume the life span of alliances is
usually no more than five years (Kogut 1988b, 1989).
Data
The sample includes 140 mergers and acquisitions and
145 strategic alliances which were established in the
ASIC industry in the period 1985-1994. ASIC—
application-specific integrated circuits—are a special
type of ICs (integrated circuits) accounting for about 16%
of worldwide IC sales in 1994 (the final year in the period
studied in this paper). The development and production
of ASICs requires the interplay between different eco-
nomic agents. The most important participants are the
ASIC design houses, IC manufacturing facilities, elec-
tronic system houses, and CAD-tool vendors. Most stra-
tegic alliances and merger and acquisition activities in the
ASIC industry are likely to have the purpose of extemal
technology sourcing. In a turbulent high-tech environ-
ment like the ASIC industry, firms are likely to link up
with each other in order to keep up with the newest tech-
nologies (Duysters and Hagedoom 2002, Osbom and
Hagedoom 1997). Stand alone strategies become increas-
ingly inviable, even for the largest companies. The high
pace of technological development and the multitude of
strategic alliances and mergers and acquisitions make the
ASIC industry a particularly attractive field for studying
the phenomenon of technology sourcing through alli-
ances and mergers/acquisitions.
The agreements between firms were entered as dyads.
Strategic alliances were considered to be nondirectional
so that reversed-ordered dyads were not included. Ac-
quisitions are, of course, directional: There is an acquirer
and an acquired firm. As a result, the data stmcture is a
cross-sectional time-series panel, in which each dyad in-
cludes the dependent variable, indicating if the dyad is an
acquisition or a strategic alliance, and time-varying and
time-constant covariates characterizing the dyad-year.
To find out to what extent prior strategic technology
alliances infiuence the choice between newly established
strategic alliances or acquisitions, we combined data from
two sources. The first is the MERIT-CATI databank on
strategic technology alliances (Duysters and Hagedoom
1993). Strategic technology alhances include joint re-
search projects, joint development agreements, cross li-
censing, (mutual) second-source agreements, technology
sharing, R&D consortia, minority holdings, and joint ven-
tures, but no licensing agreements or production and mar-
keting agreements. The second is the securities data da-
taset on mergers and acquisitions. A selection was made
of strategic alliances and mergers and acquisitions whose
major focus was on the ASIC industry. The MERIT-
CATI databank covers the period between 1975 and
1994: For that period 222 strategic technology alliances
were detected. The Securities Data dataset listed 140 ac-
quisitions for the period 1985-1994. Information on ac-
quisitions announced before 1984 was not available.
There were 145 strategic alliances established in the pe-
riod 1985-1994. As a result, there is an almost equal dis-
tribution between strategic alliances (50.9%) and acqui-
sitions (49.1%) for the period included.
There were 52 acquirers and 120 firms that were ac-
quired in the period 1985-1994. There were 118 different
firms involved in the strategic alliances. A considerable
number of firms were active in both strategic alliances
and acquisitions; 31 (59.6%) acquirers were also estab-
lishing one or more strategic alliances in 1985-1994 and
28 (23.3%) acquired firms were involved in prior strategic
alliances. The distribution between strategic alliances and
acquisitions varies considerably over time. Figure 1 sug-
gests that strategic alliances and acquisitions tend to come
in waves. The literature provides different theoretical ex-
planations for this phenomenon: The occurrence of
merger waves has been explained by institutional changes
(Stigler 1950), business cycles (Town 1992, Van Wegberg
1994b), or by a bandwagon effect (Hay and Morris 1991).
A sharp increase in strategic alliances occurred in the
early and mid-1980s. Their popularity diminished in the
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late 1980s and the early 1990s. During that period merg-
ers and acquisitions became relatively more important.
The strategic alliances are mainly nonequity agreements
(80.0%), of which the majority are joint development
agreements (62.1% of all strategic alliances). Other types
of nonequity alliances—in decreasing order of impor-
tance—are joint research programs, technology sharing,
cross-licensing, and second-source agreements. Joint
ventures are the most important form of equity alliances
(11.7% of all strategic alliances), followed by minority
holdings (8.3%)
Left censoring is a frequently occurring problem in lon-
gitudinal analysis because most of the sample firms ex-
isted before the start of the observation period in 1985.
Because data back to 1975 were available for strategic
alliances but not for acquisitions, we circumvented the
left-censoring problem by restricting our attention to the
possible impact of prior strategic alliances on the choice
between strategic alliances and acquisitions. The possible
impact of a firm's history in acquiring other firms is an
issue that cannot be analyzed here.
Variables
The unit of analysis is the dyad-year, the pair of compa-
nies involved in the establishment of an alliance or an
acquisition. No observation (dyad-year) appeared twice
in a given year. Each dyad record includes a number of
characteristics of the extemal technology acquisition ac-
tion—of both firms, and of the industry as a whole at that
point in time. Different aspects of prior cumulative alli-
ance activities until a given year are also included as ex-
planatory variables.
Dependent Variables. The dependent variable in a first
set of models is a binary choice variable, indicating
whether the pair of firms entered a strategic alliance or
an acquisition in a particular year. A strategic alliance was
coded 0 and an acquisition 1. Next, in a second set of
models testing for a possible effect of different types of
strategic alliances, we coded nonequity alliances 0, equity
alliances 1, and acquisitions 2.
Explanatory Variables. Some hypothesized effects
have to be measured by social network variables. The first
variable, called prior ties, is the number of prior strategic
alliances concluded between the dyad partners in the past.
As explained in the argumentation leading to Hypothesis
1, these prior ties are indicators of how well the two firms
know each other, and the extent to which information
asymmetry and indigestibility problems may be assumed
to be alleviated. Hypothesis 1 suggests that prior ties be-
tween the companies in the dyad increase the probability
of an acquisition compared to companies that have no
prior ties. Therefore, we expect a positive sign for this
variable.
The second variable is called network distance. It
stands for the shortest path between two firms in the net-
work of prior strategic alliances (Wasserman and Faust
1994). We only take into consideration the shortest pos-
sible path between two firms in the network because of
the diminishing value of indirect referrals. The shortest
path between two firms in the network was calculated
using the distance routine in UCINET based on the num-
ber of edges in the geodesic. We took the natural loga-
rithm of this measure, for two reasons. First, a change in
distance between two firms matters more when this dis-
tance is small compared to the case where this distance
is already large. Second, a logarithm mitigates the effect
of the distance value for firms that are not indirectly
linked to each other by means of a path of strategic alli-
ances.' As network distance is an inverse metric of the
strength of indirect ties, we expect a positive coefficient
according to Hypothesis 2.
A third dyad characteristic refers to the industry to
which both firms in the dyad belong. As the ASIC in-
dustry can be split up into three major segments—gate
and linear arrays, standard cells and full custom ICs, and
programmable logic devices (PLDs)—dyads can belong
to three categories. The first possibility is a strategic al-
liance or acquisition between an ASIC producer and a
firm which is not an ASIC producer. Next, the two firms
may both be ASIC producers, but they belong to two
different segments within the ASIC industry. Finally,
companies can be ASIC producers belonging to the same
segment. We used two dummy variables; the default is a
dyad including an ASIC producer and a company that
belongs to another industry. Intraindustry is a first
dummy variable indicating that allies or acquirer and ac-
quired firms are both ASIC producers of which the (ma-
jor) ASIC sales come from a different segment, e.g., a
gate array producer and a PLD producer. Intrasegment is
another dummy variable indicating that both firms realize
(the largest share of) their ASIC sales in the same seg-
ment, e.g., two PLD producers. According to Hypothesis
3 we expect that the coefficients of both dummy variables
will be positive. Moreover, we expect that the coefficient
of the intrasegment variable should be higher than the
intraindustry variable because the preference for acqui-
sitions will be more pronounced when the dyad partners
are competitors in the same segment.
The last dyad characteristic is the nationality of the two
dyad partners. Are they located in the same economic
block (Europe, America, Asia) or not? We included a
dummy variable intertriad to indicate that strategic alli-
ances or acquisitions took place between two firms from
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different blocks (as opposed to intratriad ties). We expect
a negative sign for the coefficient of the intertriad variable
according to Hypothesis 4, indicating that companies
from different economic blocks prefer strategic alliances
compared to firms that belong to the same block.
Besides dyad characteristics we also included firm
characteristics as explanatory variables to test Hypotheses
5 and 6. We focused on two variables that are related to
the prior cumulative strategic alliance experience of each
partnering firm in the dyad. The first variable was the
number of past strategic alliances entered by each firm in
the dyad prior to the given year. This variable is called
the alliance history of the partnering firms in the dyad.
The second variable is network centrality. This variable
measures how well connected, or active, a firm is in the
overall network of past alliances. Centrality can be op-
erationalized in different ways. We choose to operation-
alize centrality by means of "betweenness centrality,"
measuring the potential control of a firm over other firms
that have no direct ties to each other. Betweenness refers
to the number of times an actor is located on the shortest
geodesic path between two other actors in the prior stra-
tegic alliance network. The expression geodesic path is
used to denote the shortest path between two points in
the network. If a certain actor is directly linked to two
other actors who are not directly linked to each other, then
the first actor is said to be "between" the other actors. We
used normalized centrality measures, controlling for the
overall network size, to make centrality measures of a
firm comparable across different years.
The inclusion of the alliance history of firms and the
centrality measures controls for firm-level heterogeneity
(Heckman and Borjas 1980). However, these variables
are highly correlated. To deal with the problems of col-
linearity we estimated their effect on the choice between
strategic alliances and acquisitions separately in two
models. As alliance history and network centrality are
firm characteristics, we have two values per dyad. In case
a dyad represents an acquisition, alliance history 1 and
network centrality 1 refer to the characteristics of the ac-
quired firm, alliance history 2 and network centrality 2
refer to those of the acquiring firm. In the case of (non-
directional) strategic alliances, such distinction between
both partners makes no sense. To test the hypothesis in
an orderly fashion, allies were randomly assigned to ei-
ther of the two variables in such a way that the mean and
variance were the same for both variables for the sample
of companies involved in alliances.
Control Variables. The choice between strategic alli-
ances and mergers and acquisitions can also be infiuenced
by factors other than the dyad and firm characteristics we
focus on in this paper. We inserted a few variables to
capture firm-specific characteristics. First, the internal
technological strength of a company was measured by the
number of ASIC-related patents that were granted during
the previous five years. R&D-intensity on the corporate
level is another indicator measuring the relative efforts
spent on technology.^ Next, the natural logarithm of
"corporate sales" was introduced as a measure for firm
size.^ Similarly, ASIC sales indicate the involvement of
companies in the ASIC industry. As R&D expenditures
and corporate sales were not available for a range of non-
ASIC producers and a few privately owned ASIC pro-
ducers, we chose to proxy R&D intensity and firm size
by averaging the available figures of the dyad partners
and treating the variable as a dyad characteristic. Finally,
captive, is another dummy variable to control for possible
effects of the fact that some large companies produce
ASICs only for their intemal needs (captive market).
These captive producers are a small minority of ASIC-
producing companies, but are nonetheless important in
terms of technological capabilities and extemal technol-
ogy acquisition activities (e.g., IBM and DEC).
We also controlled for two industry variables, the an-
nual growth rate of the industry and the alliance share in
the total number of alliances and acquisitions in the pre-
vious year. We mentioned already that the role and in-
cidence of strategic alliances and acquisitions may
change over the life cycle of an industry. In early, fiuid
stages of the industry, strategic alliances are appropriate
mechanisms to acquire technology. As an industry ma-
tures, the relative importance of mergers and acquisitions
increases (Hagedoom and Sadowski 1999). As we test
our hypotheses on data from a relatively young industry
(the ASIC industry) over a 10-year period, we must con-
trol for industry life-cycle effects. Therefore, we include
the annual growth rate of the ASIC market, as growth
rates gradually drop when the industry matures. We ex-
pect that high growth rates will be associated with a pref-
erence for alliances over acquisitions. As a result, we ex-
pect a positive coefficient for that variable.
Figure 1 suggests that strategic alliances and acquisi-
tions occur in waves. Several explanations have been pro-
vided in the theoretical part of the paper. Waves over
several years might imply that firms are prone to mimetic
behavior and that, consequently, the choice between al-
liances and acquisitions cannot be explained by the dyad
and firm characteristics alone. To control for this effect
we include in our analysis the share of strategic alliances
in all interfirm ties that are formed in the previous year.
This variable is the aggregate result of firms' choices
made in the previous year: If there is any mimetic behav-
ior, we expect a negative and significant coefficient for
this variable.
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Descriptive statistics of the variables are in Tabte 1.
Table 2 presents a correlation matrix for the variables.
The correlation matrix indicates that there are problems
of collinearity between the alliance history variable and
the network centrality variable. Therefore, we estimated
their effect on the choice between alliances and acquisi-
tions separately in two models. The matrix further shows
that the alliance history could be approximated by the
degree centrality of companies (97 and 95% for the two
variables) and that there is a fairly strong correlation be-
tween betweenness centrality and closeness centrality (53
and 58%).
Analytical Techniques
We modelled the choice between strategic alliances and
alliances using the following random effects probit
model:
with
+ b.Xij -h c.Xij, + oiij +
= Eu,, = 0.
Where y^, is the probability at time / that the announce-
ment of an external action—i.e., strategic alliance or ac-
quisition—between firms / and; takes the form of a stra-
tegic alliance; A:,-, is a time-constant vector of explanatory
variables or covariates characterizing the dyad between
firms (' and y; Xg, is a time-varying vector of explanatory
variables or covariates characterizing the dyad between
firms / and j. The error term v,-,, is decomposed into two
terms: a,-^ refiects the unobserved time-constant effects,
which are not captured by the independent effects, and
Ujj, is the usual error term, which is independently dis-
tributed over the dyads ij, with arbitrary serial correlation.
Finally, O is the cumulative normal distribution function.
The model accounts for unobserved heterogeneity using
a random-effects approach (Butler and Moffitt 1982).
This random-effects technique is computed by means of
a routine available in LIMDEP 7.0 (Greene 1996).
When analyzing on a time series of cross-sections, "un-
observed heterogeneity" or unobserved time-invariant ef-
fects may occur. Firms may differ in their propensity to
establish alliances or to acquire other firms because of
unobserved factors which are not captured by any of the
independent variables. "If this noise were systematic for
the same unit over time, it could lead to serial correlation
among the error terms for those observations, which
would lead to consistent but inefficient coefficients"
(Gulati 1999, p. 409). Standard probit models cannot cope
with unobserved heterogeneity. The random-effects panel
probit model (Butler and Moffitt 1982), on the contrary,
tackles this statistical problem. It generates a coefficient
p, which stands for the proportion of the variance of the
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Choice; alliance (0), acquisition (1)
Choice; nonequity alliance (0), acquisition (1)
Alliance history firm 1
Alliance history firm 2
Degree centrality firm 1
Degree centrality firm 2
Closeness centrality firm 1
Closeness centrality firm 2
Betweenness centrality firm 1
Betweenness centrality firm 2
In (network distance)
Prior ties
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error term generated by unobservabte firm-specific vari-
ables.
Results
The estimated parameters are reported in Tabtes 3 and 4.
Table 3 represents the results for the firms' choice be-
tween strategic alliances and merger/acquisitions. Table
4 takes into account that companies also have more
choices when appropriating extemal technology: We
make a simple distinction between nonequity and equity
alliances as the first two options to acquire technology,
while an acquisition is the third option. We estimated
three models each time. The first model reports the impact
of the covariates included as controls. The second and
third models include the hypothesized effects. The second
model takes the betweenness centrality of firms as a mea-
sure of the network positioning of a firm in the past. This
variable is replaced in Model 3 by the alliance history of
a company. The regressions are estimated by means of a
random-effects (ordered) probit model.
Several conclusions can be drawn from Model t in
Table 3. The negative and significant sign for the firm
size variable in the first model indicates strategic alliances
are more likely to occur when the dyad is composed of
large firms."* Second, there is a significant effect of the
growth rate of the ASIC industry particular year on the
choice between strategic alliances or acquisitions. The
negative and highly significant coefficient confirms our
expectation that as the ASIC industry matures, acquisi-
tions as forms of extemal technology sourcing become
relatively more prominent compared to strategic alli-
ances.
The coefficient of the variable "strategic alliances
share " is negative (as expected) but not significant. This
indicates that there is no clear evidence for the mimetic
behaviour of companies in their choice between alliances
and acquisitions once strategic alliances or acquisitions
become fashionable. The same holds for the variable cap-
tive ASIC producers. These captive producers seem to
have a slight preference for acquisitions over alliances,
but the results are inconclusive. The coefficients of the
control variables remain unchanged in Models 2 and 3.
The existence of prior alliances between two partners
(prior ties) increases the chances that one acquires the
other—See Models 2 and 3. This finding supports the
existence of incremental strategies in which firms use al-
liances as vehicles for dealing with initial problems of
information asymmetry and mitigating problems of man-
agerial indigestibility, eventually leading to acquisition
(Hypothesis t). This puts into perspective the conclusion
drawn by Hagedoom and Sadowski (t999) that transfor-
mation of strategic alliances into acquisitions hardly plays
Table 3 Determinants of the Choice Between Strategic

























Prior experience with strategic alliances:
Network centrality firm 1
Network centrality firm 2
Aliiance history firm 1






































































Note, a: Dependent variable (strategic aliiance = 0; merger or ac-
quisition = 1).
b: The three models use random effects probit estimates.
**p<0.01.
* 0.01 < p < 0.05.
•'"0.05< p<0.10.
f-statistics are in parentheses.
a role. If repeated strategic alliances between the same
partners over time are taken into account, the phenome-
non tums out not to be insignificant.
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Table 4 Determinants of the Choice Between Nonequity
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Note, a: Dependent variable (nonequity aliiance = 0; equity
alliance = 1; merger or acquisition = 2),
b: The three modeis use random-effects-ordered probit
estimates,
**p<0.01.
*0.01 < p< 0.05.
^0.05 < p <0.10,
f-statistics are in parentheses.
The variable network distance is an inverse metric of
the strength of indirect ties between firms. Thus, the posi-
tive coefficient in Table 3 indicates that the existence of
indirect ties in the network of alliances increases the like-
lihood that two firms establish a strategic alliance rather
than an acquisition. This suggests that in contrast with
direct ties, indirect ties do not appear to play a role in
incrementally dealing with information asymmetry, with
the ultimate goal of an acquisition, but increase the prob-
ability that extemal acquisition of technology will take
the form of a strategic alliance. Hypothesis 2 is con-
firmed.
The dummy variables intraindustry tie and intraseg-
ment tie are introduced to test Hypothesis 3—The default
is an interindustry tie, i.e., between an ASIC producer and
a firm from another industry. According to the hypothesis,
we expect first that the coefficients for these two variables
are positive and, second, that the coefficient of "intraseg-
ment tie" has in its turn a significantly higher value than
the "intraindustry variable." The results in Table 3 indi-
cate that ties within the same industry, but within different
segments (intraindustry), make strategic alliances more
likely when compared with ties across industries. There
is also a positive, but not significant effect of ties within
the same segment (intrasegment). These findings run
counter to the predictions based on Hypothesis 3. Both
the indigestibility argument and the information asym-
metry argument point in the direction of a larger proba-
bility of an acquisition if the firms are more alike, so the
finding for intraindustry is striking. However, our finding
is comparable to that of Hennart and Reddy (1997), who
found that acquisitions were more likely (than greenfield
joint ventures) if the partners were in different industries.
Hennart and Reddy explain their observation, assuming
that there is a strong connection between a diversification
strategy and a preference of acquisitions over other ex-
temal actions, since acquisitions allow entrants to pur-
chase going firms. This explanation points at firm strategy
as a possible factor infiuencing the choice between stra-
tegic alliances and acquisitions not included in our study.
The coefficient of the "intrasegment" variable is sig-
nificantly higher than that of the "intraindustry" variable,
indicating that acquisitions are more likely to occur when
two ASIC producers belong to the same industry segment
compared to the case where they belong to different seg-
ments.
The dummy variable intertriad tie has a negative and
significant coefficient. This means that extemal sourcing
of technology in the ASIC industry tends to take the form
of acquisitions in the case of intratriad dyads and strategic
alliances in the case of intertriad dyads, as was predicted
by Hypothesis 4.
The position in the prior strategic alliance network of
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the two firms in a dyad also seems to be an important
explanatory variable. The negative and significant coef-
ficient of network centrality firm 1 (calculated as the be-
tweenness centrality) indicates that firms that were cen-
trally located in the prior SA network are less likely to
become acquired by other firms. Similariy, the positive
and significant coefficient of network centrality firm 2
indicates that firms with a prominent role in the prior SA
network are more likely to become acquirers. Similar re-
sults were obtained when betweenness centrality was re-
placed by other measures of centrality (not reported in the
table) or by the alliance history of the firms (see Model
3). These results support Hypotheses 5 and 6. As men-
tioned before, these variables also control for firm-level
heterogeneity, which can occur if individual companies
display time-constant propensities to engage in strategic
alliances or acquisitions that are not captured by any of
the explanatory variables.
Besides firm-level heterogeneity there is also a poten-
tial for dyad-level heterogeneity. This concern is ad-
dressed by the random-effects probit model. A random-
effect probit routine generates a parameter p, which is an
indicator of the presence or absence of dyad-level hetero-
geneity. The estimate is weakly significant, indicating
that there is some evidence that dyads may display a time-
independence preference for alliances or acquisitions that
cannot be explained by the independent variables in the
model. We could think of organizational and managerial
routines that are developed as companies got acquainted
with managing alliances or acquisitions so that they stick
to that one particular way to acquire technology.
Table 4 presents the results from the random-effects-
ordered models where the dependent variable represents
an ordering of the degree of control and level of financial
and managerial involvement associated with each type of
extemal technology sourcing. Nonequity alliances, equity
alliances, and acquisitions are ordered according to in-
creasing levels of control and involvement. We ordered
the options in such a way that nonequity alliances have
the lowest value and equity alliances have an intermediate
position. For reasons of brevity, we will only comment
on selected results.
The most important result is that the coefficients of the
independent variables are quite similar to those reported
in Table 3, and by and large consistent with the hypoth-
esized effects. The high degree of consistency across the
results in the two tables highlights the fact that the origi-
nal choice between alliances and acquisitions can be re-
fined by introducing more options and ordering them ac-
cording to their strength, as has been suggested by
Contractor and Lorange (1988), Gulati (1995b), or Nohria
and Garcia-Pont (1991).
Finally, a represents the effect of the dyad-level het-
erogeneity, i.e., the time-invariant propensity of pairs of
firms to choose for one of the three technology acquisition
modes. We can recalculate the effect of this variable as
the proportion of the total variance in the dependent vari-
able explained by the unobservable dyad-level heteroge-
neity^ and compare it with the values of p in Table 3.
This variable is responsible for 42-48% of the total var-
iance in Table 3 and 38^3% in Table 4.
Conclusions and Suggestions for
Further Research
An extensive literature on strategic alliances and mergers
and acquisitions exists, but it tells us little about how
firms choose between technology-based strategic alli-
ances and acquisitions. This study makes an attempt to
fill this void by examining the circumstances under which
firms prefer strategic alliances to acquisitions as a mode
of extemal technology sourcing.
By focusing on the dyad as the unit of analysis, this
study provides empirical support for the effect of prior
direct and indirect ties on the current choice between stra-
tegic alliances and acquisitions. Prior alliances between
two companies increase the probability that one will ul-
timately acquire the other. In contrast, indirect ties in the
prior network of strategic alliances increase the probabil-
ity that a subsequent direct link between the two firms
will take the form of a strategic alliance. This finding
suggests a qualitative difference between the effects of
direct and indirect ties. While direct ties help to dissolve
information asymmetry and mitigate (managerial) indi-
gestibility, the effect of indirect ties cannot be explained
in the same way. Indirect ties, while helpful in providing
information conceming potential alliance partners (Gulati
1999), do not provide the fine-grained information desir-
able for an acquisition. Because proximity in the network
of previous alliances promotes stronger reliance on trust
and reputation in a strategic alliance, this form of extemal
technology sourcing becomes relatively more attractive
than acquisitions.
The finding with regard to the effect of intra- versus
interindustry/segment ties runs counter to the logic of
both the indigestibility and the information asymmetry
arguments. This indicates that the explanatory framework
employed in this study, transaction-cost theory, is incom-
plete. The decision to opt for a strategic alliance or an
acquisition is guided not only by considerations of trans-
action costs (in a broad sense), but also by strategic con-
siderations that cannot be reduced to transaction-cost
arguments. Previous research shows that the level of own-
ership taken in a subsidiary depends significantly on the
strategy of the parent (Gomes-Casseres 1989). The same
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may be true of the decision to create a strategic alliance
or to perform a merger or acquisition.
The findings with regard to differences between intra-
and intertriad ties do indeed correspond to expectations
based on transaction-cost theory, however. Partnering
within a particular economic block is relatively more
likely to take the form of an acquisition, and intertriad
ties are relatively more likely to be strategic alliances.
This is in line with the managerial indigestibility argu-
ment based on transaction-cost reasoning.
The positions in the network of alliances of the two
companies in a dyad influence the direction of the link—
if this has the form of an acquisition. Firms that have
positioned themselves in the center of the industry net-
work of alliances have secured timely and flexible access
to new technologies. They are in the position to take the
initiative, thereby diminishing their probability of being
acquired by another firm and increasing their chances of
themselves becoming acquirers. Furthermore, the pref-
erence of the companies for strategic alliances or acqui-
sitions is not homogeneous over the industry cycle. In the
early stages, firms prefer strategic alliances, switching to-
wards acquisitions as the industry matures. Finally, the
results did not support the idea of mimetic behavior of
firms leading to waves of either strategic alliances or ac-
quisitions.
Overall, our findings confirm the importance of
transaction-cost-related factors like information asym-
metry and indigestibility in the trade-off between differ-
ent forms of extemal technology sourcing.
Although the results of our study are interesting, the
study is limited in its scope. The study focuses narrowly
on the ASIC industry, and further studies are needed to
generalize these findings. In the paper we focused on the
choice between alliances and acquisitions, but one could
easily subdivide strategic alliances in different types. In
Table 4, we made a distinction between equity alliances
and nonequity contractual agreements. If ordered in terms
of the strength of interorganizational control they allow
for, acquisitions are assumed to offer the strongest con-
trol, followed by equity alliances and nonequity alliances.
In our empirical analysis we found strong support for this
assumption. Differentiating between these different types
of alliances (e.g.. Contractor and Lorange 1988) may re-
sult in an even more accurate picture.
There are a number of fruitful directions for future re-
search. Including more detailed financial data for each
firm mentioned could enrich the study. In a dyadic con-
text, we could measure how differences in financial char-
acteristics of firms impact their choice between strategic
alliances and acquisitions. In this study we compared only
strategic alliances and acquisitions, and we excluded im-
plicitly the nonoccurrence of either form of extemal tech-
nology sourcing. Making the three options explicit, how-
ever, was not possible because the borders of the relevant
network are hard to define and the financial data for a
number of partner companies outside the ASIC industry
were not available.
Finally, taking the dyad as the unit of analysis also has
its limitations and drawbacks. In order to have a complete
picture of a company's choice between strategic alliance
and acquisition, another study taking the firm as the unit
of analysis should complement this one. This would give
us a better understanding of a firm's choice between dif-
ferent forms of extemal technology-sourcing by relating
it to its portfolio of prior extemal technology sourcing
activities and other firm characteristics, such as indicators
of its strategic intent and posture.
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Endnotes
'UCINET sets the distance between firms which are not linked to one
another by at least one path of any distance, i.e., disconnected sub-
groups, equal to the number of firms in the network.
^Neither variable—ASIC related patents or R&D intensity—generated
any effect on the choice between alliances and acquisitions. Therefore,
they were dropped from the models in Tables 3 and 4.
'Corporate sales are a good proxy for R&D expenditures: For the com-
panies for whom figures where available, the correlation between sales
and R&D expenditure was 0.91.
""We could replace corporate sales by the ASIC sales, but we preferred
corporate sales because both are measures of company size and ASIC
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